[BUG] Signature verifier uses an implicit certification trust model #17
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erix/exsh#17
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Summary
The owned source-signature verifier emits GPG certification warnings while using
an independently selected key and allowed primary fingerprint. Its command leaves
GPG's web-of-trust model implicit, although that model does not decide source
acceptance. Fifteen such warnings remain in the latest successful compiler
diagnostic. This prevents a claim that the complete diagnostic logs are warning-free.
Reproduction
At Exsh 906cfb5a,
run the owned source-signature path with its independently approved GPG binary,
the declared original key bytes and an allowed signed commit. The verifier
imports the key into a fresh originally owned directory, then invokes GPG with
--no-options --batch --no-tty --no-autostart, that directory, disabled automatickey retrieval and counted status output. The verification command supplies no
explicit trust model. The isolated key directory has no web-of-trust certification.
Expected and actual behavior
Expected: configure GPG consistently with the existing external key/fingerprint
validation, while preserving signature validity, exact signer, key identity,
expiry, revocation, missing-key, framing and first-error checks. All complete
diagnostic logs should then be free of certification warnings.
Actual: GPG reports that the key lacks certification. The original signature-status
parser and independently allowed primary fingerprint checks succeed. The host
compiler capture exits zero in 227.63 seconds, with confirmed outer cleanup and
no warnings in the compiler/helper streams; the signature-operation logs retain
15 genuine warnings. Retain that original evidence.
Environment and identity
906cfb5af32c0befee27126ae1d8847afe6647ee.4a87840c0343314fdc1957dc64bcf07c1d4c9a2a.ef2f0a5583bfffebdd6b71a71643b3c9fb1d79f8.exsh-runtime.existing finite clocks and aggregate byte allowances.
Evidence and prior checks
The signature verifier
checks the original key digest, verifier role and exactly one allowed primary
fingerprint. It rejects bad, expired, revoked, missing and error statuses; trust
classification is descriptive data. This contract should remain unchanged.
Make the verification trust model explicit and bind its trusted-key selection
only to the independently approved, actually imported primary fingerprints.
The full fingerprint status parser remains required; GPG trust labels or key
IDs cannot replace it. Missing imported identities must refuse before any
trusted-key option could trigger key discovery. Keep this configuration
local to the owned verification command.
--trust-model alwaysalone doesnot meet the warning-free requirement.
GnuPG configuration reference
Verify the changed command with the exact approved binary and original positive
and foreign-key/bad-signature/expiry/revocation/framing controls. Do not suppress
stderr, change global trust databases, fetch keys or treat the option as source
approval. Host diagnostic success does not establish deployment, frame, guest
or complete source-consumption acceptance.
Tracking
Related contracts: owned source evidence
and isolated compiler invocation.
Implementation belongs in the Exsh review.
Keep exact selected key/fingerprint and original native custody while making the
verification configuration explicit; update its inline contract and independent
controls together.
The first native check of
--trust-model alwaysverifies the original signature, but GPG still emits “WARNING: Using untrusted key!”. The warning-free check therefore fails and the original result is retained. No implementation was published. The next candidate will use only independently approved, present primary keys for its explicit trust configuration, with the complete fingerprint and invalid-signature checks preserved. GnuPG’s option contract also requires care around missing trusted keys and key discovery.Fixed in a6aa6b48. GPG now receives explicit trust only for independently approved full primary fingerprints present in the same key import. Missing identities stop before verification; the strict signature-status checks still decide acceptance.
A fresh freestanding compiler capture completed in 221.16 seconds with confirmed outer cleanup. All fifteen signature verifications and the complete command streams are free of the original certification warnings. The 641 parser controls preserve malformed-status, signer, expiry, revocation and missing-key refusals; focused native cases also reject altered payloads, damaged signatures and absent approved keys. The failed always-trust attempt remains retained.
This resolves the certification-warning report. The broader source and runtime admission work remains tracked in #4 and #15.