[FEATURE] Retain checked ext permission snapshots through conditional truncation #7
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erix/e2fsd#7
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Problem and motivation
The ext provider preserves attributes but cannot yet serve the existing private permission snapshot and conditional-truncate operations. Compatibility policy needs known ownership and complete ACL evidence associated with the original retained object, plus freshness checked before effects.
Proposed behavior and scope
Implement retained-handle permission snapshots and conditional truncation in the ext provider using the existing shared ABI. Read the original checksum-checked inode and inspect both attribute tables. Decode complete local access ACLs in canonical order, without a separate entry-count ceiling, and reject malformed or mode-inconsistent ACLs. Default ACLs do not stand in for access ACLs.
Retain a full permission fingerprint and a unique snapshot revision in each existing handle row. Both metadata setters invalidate prior snapshots before attempting selected mode/ownership/flag changes; failed or no-op attempts may invalidate conservatively. Conditional truncation requires the original revision, unchanged metadata epoch and freshly read identical evidence, then consumes the snapshot before invoking the shared retained-object resize path.
Separate value-inode ACL payload acquisition and canonical entry transport remain required follow-ups. Such payloads explicitly refuse in this increment; they cannot become absent-ACL evidence or mode-only fallback. Complete native mediator enforcement remains open.
Authority, security and reliability
The existing native private endpoint and original retained handle remain required. Numbers, credentials, hashes and successful representation checks grant no capability. Exact-entry operation handles must not acquire broader metadata rights. Ordinary already-open reads/writes/truncation keep their operation-specific semantics. Evidence storage is part of the deployment-owned handle arena and is cleared on close/reset; identities and snapshot revisions never wrap or repeat. Failed reads invalidate the attempted snapshot. Short replies refuse before I/O or mutation. A stale comparison returns RETRY without replay.
The provider serializes comparison and effects and relies on its admitted exclusive mounted-device ownership. Read-time fingerprints also reject observed media changes. They do not authenticate a hostile backing device or prove a historical absence of out-of-provider writes.
Acceptance criteria
Alternatives and tradeoffs
A global metadata epoch conservatively invalidates snapshots across aliases and avoids an allocation-backed inode registry. A distinct non-reused snapshot revision prevents replacement evidence from silently reviving an old request. The full SHA-256 fingerprint uses an existing internal dependency; a truncated hash or legacy stat cannot establish equivalent evidence. Re-reading adds media work but avoids pretending an in-memory epoch describes unobserved external changes. Performance measurement remains deferred by user instruction.
Tracking and rollout
Retained ext permission evidence — 29 September 2026: e2fsd
15a9e671, docs7c1f39e3, integrationf0ab7f5c. E2fsd#7 implements actual private snapshot and conditional-truncate dispatch using original checked inode metadata and complete local access ACLs. Both physical stores are examined; canonical structure, full qualifiers, required masks and mode correspondence are checked. Unsupported value-inode ACL payloads refuse rather than becoming absent evidence.Each retained handle stores a unique snapshot revision, metadata epoch and full fingerprint. Both metadata setters invalidate before selected permission/flag attempts. A conditional effect consumes matching evidence, re-reads complete permissions and reaches the shared retained-object resize only after an exact fingerprint match. Short replies refuse before I/O. Close/reset cannot revive revisions; compiled record geometry sizes the existing arena. Native endpoint authority and ordinary open-descriptor semantics remain required.
Seventeen new controls are authored but unrun, including actual wire dispatch and resize effects. The provider contract, ext review, manual review and catalog review record the boundary. Three immutable catalog entries select the original signed provider/manual revisions. Formatting was applied; tests, builds, lint checks, rustdoc, VM/manual/profiler runs and CI observation remain deferred. No pass or warning-free build is claimed.
The completed provider sub-item raises weighted checklist progress to 16.19%; the parent remains open. Value-inode payload integrity/acquisition, canonical ACL entry transport, ACL-aware persistent metadata mutation and native caller/route/policy enforcement remain unfinished. Both full EriX guest builds and the external Rust/LLVM guest rebuild remain required and unproved.
Coordinate with permission policy, shared contract, ext review, manual review, Integration review and phase completion. No new opcode or dependency revision is needed. Tests, builds, lint checks and CI observation are deferred; written controls are not executed evidence.
erikinkinen referenced this issue2026-09-29 10:12:00 +02:00
erikinkinen referenced this issue from erix/docs2026-09-29 10:12:01 +02:00
erikinkinen referenced this issue from erix/integration2026-09-29 10:12:03 +02:00